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 n 16 June 2015, the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights 
delivered the final judgment in Delfi AS. v 
Estonia, where it ruled that the decision to hold 
an Internet Service Provider liable for online, 
anonymous defamatory comments was 
compatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights, thus raising serious concerns on 
the enjoyment of the right to freedom of 
expression on the Internet[1].  
Delfi is one of the largest web news portals in 
Estonia. It allows users to post comments on 
news stories without requiring prior registration, 
which appear automatically without moderation, 
though the website has an automatic filter that 
deletes comments containing obscene words as 
well as a notice-and-take-down system that 
enables users to report defamatory comments. 
Defamatory comments are deleted by the 
company upon review. In January 2006, Delfi 
published an article on roads over the frozen sea 
in Estonia, which—although not defamatory in its 
nature—attracted a wide number of offensive 
comments. In March 2006, an individual known as 
L. requested Delfi to remove such defamatory 
comments and pay damages. As a result, Delfi 
removed immediately the comments. However, 
since it refused to pay damages, L. sued Delfi 
before an Estonian court, which issued a 
decision—later upheld by the Estonian Supreme 
Court—that awarded him damages in the amount 
of Euro 320. Delfi then challenged the judgment 
before the European Court of Human Rights, 
which rejected its application. The case was 
subsequently referred to the Grand Chamber of 
the Court.  
Delfi claimed that the decision of the Estonian 
Supreme Court imposed an obligation to maintain 
a preventive censorship policy in violation of the 
right to freedom of expression provided for by 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This provision protects the ‘freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.’ 
However, the Convention allows restrictions on 
this right when they are ‘prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society’ to protect 
a number of legitimate aims, including national 
security, crime prevention, health, morals and the 
reputation or rights of others[2].  
 If Internet Service Providers (ISPs) bore 
vicarious liability for illegal content 
uploaded by others, even if not aware of 
its existence, this would place a 
disproportionate financial burden on them 
The most contentious issue of this case is not the 
limitation of the right to freedom of expression of 
anonymous commenters itself, but the decision to 
hold the news portal liable for the comments 
posted on its website by others. This type of 
liability is known as the vicarious responsibility 
of Internet Service Providers (ISPs). In the 
European Union (EU), the normative framework 
on ISPs’ liability is laid down by the E-commerce 
Directive 2000/31/EC, which exempts hosting 
service providers (such as blogs or websites) 
from vicarious liability for the information stored 
at the request of a user (for example, a comment 
posted to a blog post). Under Article 15 of the 
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Directive, ISPs have neither an obligation to 
monitor the information they transmit or store, 
nor a general obligation to actively seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity. Their 
responsibility may only be engaged if the 
provider, upon obtaining knowledge of hosting 
illegal content, fails to act expeditiously to 
remove or disable access to the impugned 
information[3]. The underpinning idea is that if 
ISPs bore vicarious liability for illegal content 
uploaded by others, even if not aware of its 
existence, this would place a disproportionate 
financial burden on them to impose filtering 
systems, blocking measures and detection 
methods to prevent illegal content from being 
published online. However, once a user notifies 
the ISP of the illegal content, the latter is 
expected to act expeditiously to block the access 
thereto (notice-and-takedown procedure), 
otherwise it will bear responsibility for the 
subsequent legal consequences. This establishes 
a ‘safe harbour’ for ISPs, since they are immune 
from vicarious liability, as long as they have no 
knowledge of the illegality of the content that 
they host. In this vein, the European Court of 
Justice issued a judgment in 2012, declaring that 
ISPs do not have an obligation to filter content. 
The judgment precluded a national court from 
issuing an injunction against an ISP requiring it to 
install a system for filtering information stored on 
its servers by its users, at its own expenses, to 
identify and prevent the publication of content 
infringing copyright. This principle is applicable 
to all cases of illegal content, such as spyware, 
malware and also hate speech[4]. 
Nevertheless, the domestic courts of Estonia 
disregarded this framework and came up with a 
different reasoning, which was subsequently 
supported by the Grand Chamber. Contrary to 
Delfi’s contention that the news portal should be 
classified as an ISP with regards to third-party 
comments, the Grand Chamber considered Delfi 
as the direct publisher of the content itself, thus 
placing vicarious liability for the illegal material 
on the intermediary. In a highly criticised line of 
reasoning, the Grand Chamber stressed that ‘it is 
not its task to take the place of the domestic 
courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, 
notably the courts, to interpret and apply 
domestic law’[5]. Thus, it upheld the domestic 
courts’ findings on the legality of the measure 
and explored whether this measure was the least 
burdensome and more proportionate in view of 
the legitimate aim pursued. Contrary to its 
previous case law that the punishment of a 
journalist assisting in the dissemination of 
statements made by others in the context of an 
interview would seriously hamper freedom of the 
press[6], the Grand Chamber held that it is 
legitimate to sanction the portal to protect 
another person’s right. Although the comments in 
question had been removed upon notification by 
L., the person concerned, the Grand Chamber 
held that the portal exercised a substantial 
degree of control over the comments and, 
contrary to the Directive, should have prevented 
their publication in the first place. In view of the 
insignificant amount of the fine, the Grand 
Chamber held that the measure was 
proportionate and not in breach of freedom of 
speech.  
The reasoning of the Grand Chamber is 
flawed in its foundations as it disregards the 
fact that imposing vicarious liability on ISPs 
may have a chilling effect on freedom of 
expression 
The reasoning of the Grand Chamber is flawed in 
its foundations as it disregards the fact that 
imposing vicarious liability on ISPs may have a 
chilling effect on freedom of expression, in the 
sense that it will encourage ISPs to delete 
comments under the threat of sanction, thus 
leading  to a ‘slippery slope’ that could shatter 
the architecture of the Internet as a whole. In the 
present case, the Grand Chamber addressed the 
issue of content regulation in cyberspace by 
striking a balance between safeguarding freedom 
of expression and providing a minimum level of 
protection to the other fundamental values 
involved. However, in its attempt to deliver a new 
interpretative approach to this end, the Grand 
Chamber did not properly weigh the potentially 
detrimental effects of its decision on freedom of 
expression in cyberspace. If ISPs are held 
vicariously accountable for the content that they 
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host, they will probably avoid the risk of 
incurring liability by imposing censorship on web 
users and limiting access proactively to their 
websites. This would not only hamper online 
freedom of expression, but could also entail 
catastrophic economic repercussions for e-
commerce, as it would require ISPs to set up, at 
their own expenses, costly mechanisms of 
prevention and filtering systems for comments 
(which are highly profitable for marketing 
purposes), thus restraining the free flow of 
information on the Web. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, in the Delfi case the Grand 
Chamber ignored the rationale underlying the 
current European regulatory framework. This 
further shows that such legal framework is not 
sufficient to preserve fundamental rights in 
cyberspace. The issue of cyberspace regulation, 
has now gained prominence and urgency once 
again, as Delfi made it clear that a new regulatory 
approach is imminently called for. Given the 
substantially de-territorialised features and 
transnational character of cyberspace, which 
pose significant difficulties to any national 
regulatory attempt, it can only be efficiently 
regulated on international or, at least, 
multinational level. Since international regulatory 
attempts have consistently been unsuccessful in 
the past and domestic approaches to the matter 
are confronted with considerable difficulties, the 
Internet had to develop mechanisms to 
effectively regulate itself (i.e. by implementing 
codes of conduct and mechanisms of self-
correction, such as the notice-and-takedown 
procedure), so as to avoid the creation of a 
regulatory gap. The application of self-regulation 
in cyberspace was in accordance with the 
concept of ‘good regulation’, whereby public 
regulatory intervention is called for only when 
other, less invasive alternatives have failed[7]. 
However, the Delfi case proves that the self-
regulatory approach cannot be deemed sufficient 
to achieve the necessary level of protection of 
fundamental rights if not strengthened with 
centrally implemented measures, as well as that 
Directive 2000/31/EC is clearly not enough to 
this end. Against this background, the Delfi case 
should encourage the debate on a new regulatory 
initiative on EU level that would achieve legal 
harmonisation in cyberspace regulation and 
preserve freedom of expression, thus helping the 
courts evade such ‘slippery slopes’ altogether in 
the future. 
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